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Tracing the History of Medicare
Home Health Care:
The Impact of Policy on Benefit Use
JOAN K. DAVIT
University of Pennsylvania
School of Social Policy & Practice
SUNHA CHOI
Binghamton University
Department of Social Work
We trace key policy changes that affected use of the Medicare home
health benefit from the 1980s through the prospective payment
system implemented in 2000, analyzing the impact on three mea-
sures of home care use: expenditures, users and visits. We dem-
onstrate the impact of policies generated in the legislative, the ju-
dicial, and the executive branches of government and the gaming
behavior of home health agencies in response to policy changes.
Our analysis suggests that the policy itself and the implementa-
tion process are critical to understanding benefit use. The incen-
tives in the policies and agency reactions had the potential to gen-
erate fraud in two directions, either over or underuse. Throughout
this history, use of the benefit was driven less by patient need than
by arbitrary interpretations of eligibility. These interpretations
were in turn influenced by opposing ideologies favoring redis-
tribution based on market principles versus those based on need.
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Introduction
Medicare, created in 1965 as an amendment to the Social
Security Act (P.L. 89-97), established the first system of public
health insurance for the elderly in this country. The original
statute focused on covering older adults' acute health care
needs, since this was perceived as the area in which the elderly
were most financially vulnerable to catastrophic losses. It did
not, however, rule out post-acute care as an appropriate option
to meet the healthcare needs of older adults. Both home health
care and nursing facility care were part of the original law.
However, home health care benefits were restricted. Under
Part A (the hospital insurance trust fund), home health servic-
es were limited to 100 days per benefit period for patients who
had spent at least three days in the hospital immediately prior
to receiving home care. Part B (the supplementary medical in-
surance trust fund) covered up to 100 days per year for pa-
tients with or without a hospital stay with both a deductible
($60 in the beginning) and a 20% copay.
All patients under the original law and currently have to
meet certain eligibility criteria in order to have Medicare pay
for home health care. They have to be homebound, in need of
intermittent skilled care, have a physician certify and review
the care plan, and the agency delivering the service has to be
Medicare certified. The services rendered by the agency have
to be medically reasonable and necessary in order for Medicare
to reimburse the agency. Specific services covered by Medicare
include: skilled nursing, physical therapy, speech therapy, oc-
cupational therapy, home health aide services, and medical
social work.
Actual eligibility criteria have changed little since the
program's inception. However, interpretation of those crite-
ria has varied historically, at times enhancing benefit access
and at other times restricting access. In this paper, we analyze
the major policy changes in the program and their impact
on utilization of the home care benefit, mainly in the fee-for-
service program. We give a brief summary of policy debates
and changes in the 1970s to set the stage for dramatic changes
which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. We highlight changes
in program use measured by actual figures (e.g. costs, users,
and visits) as well as growth in use over time. Our rationale
for discussing actual use and program growth is related to the
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assumptions made by analysts at various historical points and
the use of growth rates to argue for program cuts. Finally, we
offer a critical analysis of the policy incentives, their impact on
agency practice and on benefit use.
Major Policy Shifts and Impact on the Program
The 1970s
The political atmosphere of the 1970s was one of Medicare
expansion. Medicare was viewed by many policy makers as
a "first step toward universal [health] coverage" (Ball, 1996,
p. 13). For example, in 1972, amendments to Social Security
(PL. 92-603) expanded Medicare eligibility to those receiving
Social Security Disability and, in 1978, to those with End Stage
Renal Disease, thus enhancing Medicare access for chroni-
cally ill individuals. In home health care, specifically, the 1972
amendments eliminated the Part B coinsurance requirement
(Benjamin, 1993). Waiver of liability was established for denied
claims when the provider or beneficiary was not at fault (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1978). Also, homemaker service
delivery demonstrations were established (Benjamin, 1993).
Interestingly, the number of Medicare certified home health
agencies declined between 1970 and 1975 (Estes & Swan, 1993).
However, the number of persons served and total visits gradu-
ally increased through the 1970s while the number of visits per
user remained the same (Table 1). These increases make sense
in light of the expanding categories of Medicare enrollees and
elimination of the coinsurance barrier (Benjamin, 1993).
Supporters of home health care advocated for expansion of
the benefit to cover chronic health care needs in the late 1970s.
The rationale for expansion rested on three main points. First,
home health care was seen as a less costly alternative to hospi-
tal and nursing home care (Congressional Budget Office [CBO],
1977; General Accounting Office [GAO], 1977). Second, home
health care was considered a more humane way to provide
treatment, as it was older adults' preference to receive care
at home. Finally, Medicare needed to better cover the major
health care problems of the elderly, that is, chronic medical
conditions that did not require hospitalization (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1977, 1978; U.S. Senate, 1979).
Medicare is oriented to the coverage of acute episodic
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illness, and yet the illnesses of the elderly tend to be
chronic.... Certainly outpatient drugs, preventive
medical services, and more flexibility in the delivery
of home health care would serve to delay the need
for other more costly types of services. (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1977, p. 2)
Although there was ample pressure for expansion of the
benefit, there were also concerns related to inconsistent stan-
dards within the system, which could result in inappropri-
ate service denials (underuse) or unnecessary service use
(overuse) [Benjamin, 1993]. Issues were also raised regarding
the variation in unit costs for similar services across agencies,
and interpretations of reasonable costs and allowable admin-
istrative expenses. These inconsistencies made it impossible to
predict total program costs from year to year and thus diffi-
cult to project the financial impact of expansionary program
changes (GAO, 1978a; GAO, 1978b). These issues were raised
repeatedly by the GAO over time, but little was done to eradi-
cate these flaws.
The 1980s: Expansion vs. Retrenchinent
OBRA 1980: Expanding the Home Health Care Benefit. Sev-
eral benefit changes were made by the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1980 (OBRA). The Act removed the Part A
visit limit, 3-day hospital stay and the Part B deductible. Now
the benefit could be available to eligible enrollees without a
prior hospital stay and on an unlimited basis not subject to
out-of-pocket expenditures. Congressional intent was clearly
to expand services. The law, however, did not provide addi-
tional clarity on the intermittent care or homebound criteria
nor did it require the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) to establish consistent standards for intermediar-
ies (Keenan, Fanale, Ripsin, & Billows, 1990).
OBRA opened the Medicare home health door to for-profit
providers by eliminating the state licensure requirement for
proprietary agencies. In fact, between 1983 and 1986 the rate of
growth of proprietary agencies was 90% while non-profits grew
by 21%. In 1982 there were 471 for-profit agencies in the U.S. In
1983 this number increased to 997 (Estes & Swan, 1993). Early
studies and audits were demonstrating a tendency among pro-
prietary providers to participate in fraudulent practices, such
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as illegal subcontracting and referral kickbacks (Benjamin,
1993; Estes & Swan, 1993; U.S. House of Representatives, 1978).
Yet, this change complemented the Reagan administration's
emphasis on market-based alternatives for health and human
services.
After enactment of the changes, use of Medicare home care
increased, but not at an alarming rate (see Table 1 and Figures
1-3). Although total users and users per 1,000 enrollees in-
creased, the rate of growth in users actually declined between
1978 and 1984. Also, total visits and visits per user increased,
but the rate of growth in visits slowed dramatically. Fears that
expanded home care would not generate savings for the overall
Medicare program encouraged CMS to continue their strict in-
terpretation of the homebound and intermittent care criteria,
thereby continuing the high claims denial rate (Benjamin, 1993;
Keenan at al., 1990). Although some client outcomes, includ-
ing longevity and satisfaction with life, were improved with
the receipt of expanded home care, CMS feared that increased
longevity among patients with chronic conditions could in-
crease need for services. Second, expanding eligibility criteria
would make the benefit available to people who would other-
wise not be in the system, as home health care might substi-
tute for nursing home and/or informal care. In fact, research
showed that even if hospital and nursing home use decreased
in a given study, generally total health costs increased (GAO,
1983). Furthermore, GAO suggested that inefficiencies in the
home health cost system might contribute to increased costs.
The rhetorical battle between expansion and retrenchment
continued through the 1980s.
Expansion or revision in the present system is being
considered because of: changes in health care demands
stemming from growth in the size of the disabled
elderly population; the need to reduce high government
expenditures for nursing home and hospital care; and a
desire to improve the physical and mental health status
of the elderly. (GAO, 1983, p. i)
Congress intended to expand the benefit. However, the ex-
ecutive branch was controlled in the 1980s by fiscally conser-
vative republican presidents focused on reducing the size of
the federal budget and devolution of social and health care to
252 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
state and informal sectors. Medicare was not immune to these
reduction initiatives.
Inpatient Prospective Payment System and
Controlling Benefit Access (1983-1987)
In fact, the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS)
was established in 1983 to control Medicare hospital costs.
Implementation of the IPPS led to earlier patient discharg-
es, with sicker patients released from the hospital in greater
need of transitional support (Benjamin, 1993; Estes & Swan,
1993; Feder & Lambrew, 1996; Komisar & Feder, 1998). The as-
sumption was that post-acute services, including home health,
would increase dramatically due to this policy. However, there
were only minor increases in the number of home health users
through 1986, while total visits and visits per user decreased
between 1985 and 1987 (see Table 1). Even actual expenditures
decreased after 1984. Between 1983 and 1987 the growth rates
for home health use hit negative numbers (see Figures 1-3),
with the biggest declines in visits and visits per user.
Decreases in home care use were attributed to two CMS
transmittals to Fiscal Intermediaries (FI) issued in 1984 and
1986. The first transmittal clarified the type of care that would
be covered, "daily.. .care of an indefinite duration will not be
considered to meet the intermittent requirement and such ser-
vices are not covered under the Medicare home health benefit"
(Duggan, 1988, p. 1495). The second transmittal, responding
to questions from the FIs seeking further clarification on the
term daily, defined daily as "five days per week.. .therefore
care which is ordered five, six, or seven days per week would
be considered daily care" (Duggan, 1988, p. 1495) and would
disqualify a beneficiary from the benefit.
These transmittals in essence forced the intermediaries
to use a new standard for eligibility. This standard indicated
that patients had to meet both the part-time and intermittent
criteria in order to be eligible, since prior to these transmit-
tals, the part-time category would pick up daily care as long
as it was not for an indefinite period of time. Furthermore,
intermediaries denied the claims in full, rather than denying
the excess days. Therefore, beneficiaries with such needs were
losing complete access to the benefit.
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In the wake of these transmittals claims reviews increased,
with concurrent demand for more detailed documentation,
and an increase in claims denial rates from 3.1% in 1985 to
9.0% in 1987 (GAO, 1990). Likewise, agencies reacted to these
changes by doing less home care under the Medicare benefit.
The number of claims filed decreased by 5% between 1985 and
1986 (Estes & Swan, 1993). Given the retrospective reimburse-
ment procedure, "home health agencies were financially liable
for uncovered claims, [and] the availability of services tended
to closely reflect coverage rules" (Feder & Lambrew, 1996, p.
105). Unless the provider had a low pattern of denials, and
thus benefited from the waiver of liability, they would have
to eat the cost of denied claims. In less than one year, from
February to November 1986, the percentage of agencies that
lost this waiver went from 16% to 32% (GAO, 1990).
This new policy created by the transmittals could have been
an attempt to respond to GAO's recommendations to improve
overall system monitoring and administration. However, the
actual impact of these changes did little in the way of establish-
ing consistent and uniform guidelines on reasonable and nec-
essary costs, on patient care costs vs. administrative costs and
on upper limits for reimbursements. CMS failed to address the
identified weaknesses in the system and instead created an ar-
bitrary rule to attempt to curb utilization. Although Congress
was in favor of expanding the program, the Executive branch
at this time was keen on reducing federal government outlays
for domestic programs (Benjamin, 1993) and likely influenced
the reaction of the administrative department responsible for
issuing these transmittals.
Duggan v. Bowen (1987): The Push for Expansion
Pressure from increased demand for post-acute care due to
the IPPS and tightening of eligibility limits by CMS generated
ripe conditions for court challenges. Of specific importance
was the charge that CMS, through its intermediaries, was using
arbitrary mechanisms to constrain expenditure growth (Feder
& Lambre-, 1996). This culminated in a class action lawsuit
filed in 1987 (Duggan, 1988). The Duggan court ruled that CMS
had violated the letter of the law and the intent of Congress
that only full-time care be excluded from the benefit by
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creating a stricter definition of daily care and requiring that ben-
eficiaries meet both criteria, "part-time and intermittent" to be
eligible. The court also looked at the history of the benefit and
interpretations of the statute up to 1984 and found the new
transmittals to be antithema to previous practice. Likewise,
the court found the changes to be arbitrary and capricious.
Someone could get up to eight hours of care per day on four
days per week for 32 hours per week, while a person needing
one hour of care per day for five or more days (five-seven
hours per week) would be ineligible. CMS also violated the
Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. 553) by not issuing a
notice for public comment prior to distributing the transmit-
tal. "Defendant's conversion of the 'part-time or intermittent'
requirement to a 'part-time and intermittent' requirement ef-
fected material changes. As such, these changes constitute a
new rule" (Duggan, 1988, p. 1514).
CMS was forced to revise the Medicare home health
manual. The new manual stated:
the determination of whether a beneficiary needs skilled
nursing care should be based upon the beneficiary's
unique condition and individual needs, without
regard to whether the illness or injury is acute, chronic,
terminal or expected to extend over a long period of
time. (Medicare Manual, 1989, as cited in Keenan et al.,
1990, p.1043)
The manual, issued in 1989, included several key changes
in terms of the interpretation of coverage. First, CMS rede-
fined eligibility criteria from part-time and intermittent to
part-time or intermittent need for skilled care. This allowed
those who needed care on greater than four days per week
to still receive it. Second, observations by a skilled profes-
sional and maintenance therapy were added as medically
reasonable and necessary services which could establish eli-
gibility. Patients could be given therapy in order to maintain
functional levels. Likewise, nursing visits pre-Duggan had to
be for active treatment, whereas post-Duggan, care manage-
ment services could be included under skilled care. Finally,
each visit had to be reviewed separately before denying the
entire claim. This added tremendous burden and cost to the
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intermediary process, leading to a reduction in claims denied
(Feder & Lambrew, 1996; GAO, 1996; Komisar & Feder, 1998).
The net effect of these changes was that Medicare home
care became available to more beneficiaries for less acute
conditions and longer periods of time (GAO, 1996; Feder &
Lambrew, 1996). The changes may have prevented or reduced
nursing home placement as well. Not only did the propor-
tion of elderly residing in nursing homes decline (from 4.6
to 4.1%), but the average stay decreased by 18% from 1985 to
1995 (Komisar & Feder, 1998). Furthermore, had it not been
for the transmittals in the mid-80s, expansion of home health
care probably would have increased gradually over this time,
due to the natural effects of changes in the health care delivery
system, technology and demographic patterns.
The 1990s: Rising Health Care Costs and Cost Control Measures
The patterns of increased use reflect both the trend of ex-
panding categories of eligibility and increasing use at the bene-
ficiary level. Post-Duggan growth in utilization spiked dramat-
ically in the first two years after the revised manual was issued
in 1989, but declined steadily thereafter (Table 1 and Figures
1-3). For instance, the rate of growth between 1989 and 1990 in
total expenditures was 48% and between 1990 and 1991 it was
40%. However, expenditure growth declined to 34% in 1992
and to 5% in 1996. Likewise, growth in charges per user rose
dramatically in the first two years after the revised manual,
but declined each year from 1991. The number of users per
1,000 enrollees grew by 12% between 1989 and 1990, com-
pared to 4% between 1988 and 1989, but by 1996 the growth
rate was back down to 4.9%. Likewise, total visits and visits
per user grew dramatically between 1988 and 1990. Growth in
total visits peaked in 1990 at 48% but was down to 6% in 1996.
Growth in visits per user crested in the first year after issuance
of the revised manual at 33% and then declined to a rate of
only 2.78% in 1996.
However, concerns grew around whether incentives
created by the payment system and benefit structure and lack
of administrative oversight were resulting in more home care
being provided than was needed for appropriate care. The
service-specific per-visit limits under which agencies were
paid offered little incentive for providers to control volume
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per person. At this time, each service's per-visit limit was
based on 112% of the national average for freestanding home
health agencies adjusted for wage and regional differences.
If the agency kept its costs below the national visit limits for
each service, they could simply increase profit by providing
more visits. Thus, agencies had little incentive to deliver an ef-
ficient amount or mix of services. Also, copays and deductibles
for home health care had been eliminated; beneficiaries had
little incentive to refuse services. During this period, average
payment per visit only increased by 2.2%, indicating that agen-
cies were using lower cost visit types (Komisar & Feder, 1998).
Tremendous growth in the number of proprietary providers,
increasing their market share from 36% (5,647) in 1990 to 64%
(10,524) in 1997, generated suspicion that the benefit was too
generous (GAO, 1998).
Simultaneously, Congress began cutting Medicare's ad-
ministrative funds. Thus, when claims began to increase,
funds to review the claims and to monitor the process were cut
between 1989 and 1991 (GAO, 1991). Finally, CMS still had not
developed a uniform claims processing system. Even though
the number of intermediaries was reduced to nine in 1989
from 47 in 1987 (GAO, 1990), each intermediary had its own
system, which made it almost impossible to gain accurate data
on spending patterns and potential abuse.
Broader concerns in the 1990s over rising health care costs,
their increasing share of GDP and potential depletion of the
Hospital Insurance Trust fund, generated much activity in re-
lation to controlling overall Medicare program costs. In addi-
tion, as described above, the increase in home health use and
oversight problems made the home health benefit ripe for
more careful scrutiny by policy makers attempting to control
spending and reduce the deficit. Home health care was one
of the few health care markets that had not yet been fiscally
regulated.
Congress began looking for methods to control expen-
ditures and in 1990 enacted the National Home Health
Prospective Payment Demonstration (NHHPPD). This law
resurrected the original authorization to study alternative re-
imbursement methods generated in 1983 as part of the Orphan
Drug Act (P.L. 97-414). However, it was not until 1990 that
CMS began to study alternative reimbursement strategies
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(Leon, Davitt, & Marainen, 2002). The NHHPPD attempted to
determine whether program expenditures could be reduced
by enhancing program efficiency in terms of service delivery.
The program tested "a predetermined per-visit payment rate"
(1990-1993) and a per-episode payment system (1995-1998)
(Cheh, 2001, p.1).
Even though utilization had already begun to decline
within two years of the revised manual, the first direct attempt
at controlling costs under this program consisted of a two-year
freeze on the inflation (market-basket) updates for home health
care beginning in 1994 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993). The rate of growth in users decreased steadily after the
freeze. However, total visits and visits per user growth jumped
between 1993 and 1994. This suggests that agencies may have
countered the freeze on their cost limits by providing more
visits to eligible enrollees. Thus, although the freeze reduced
expenditures overall, it did little to make the program more
adequate or efficient, because the incentives encouraged agen-
cies to simply provide more visits to recoup their losses. It did
not, unfortunately, encourage agencies to gear service to actual
patient need and reimburse accordingly.
The 1990s: The Pursuit of Fraudulent Practice
Concerns about the program also centered on whether the
program was being turned into a long-term care benefit. Leon,
Parente, and Neuman (1997) found that only 10 percent of
beneficiaries received over 200 visits, yet these 10 percent ac-
counted for over 42 percent of expenditures for Medicare home
health care in 1994. However, such patients tend to have more
complex care needs, to use greater amounts of hospital care, to
need multiple episodes of home care and to have severe func-
tional impairments (Leon, et al., 1997; Lewin Group, 1998).
The other problem, the tremendous degree of variation
in payments and visits across geographic regions and agency
types, was generated by a lack of consistent standards and
procedures for claims review across the fiscal intermediaries.
For example, two of the nine intermediaries served the vast
majority of agencies with higher than normal utilization pat-
terns (GAO, 1996), suggesting that lack of oversight and con-
sistent standards might have played a role in any inappropri-
ate benefit use. This problem had been clearly identified in
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numerous government reports as early as the 1970s (Benjamin
1993; GAO, 1978a, 1978b). Studies by the Office of Inspector
General (OIG), using 1993 data, found that "the average re-
imbursement per beneficiary for the four [types of agencies
studied] ranged from $1,534 to $7,978" (OIG, 1995a, p. 7; 1995b).
They also found wide variation in the average number of visits
with a range of 27 visits for the low utilization agencies and
141 visits for the highest agencies. The fact that proprietary
agencies provided significantly more visits than non-profit or
public agencies (GAO, 1996) increased suspicions regarding
fraudulent practice.
The highest regional average was found in Region IV, in-
cluding Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North and South Carolina and Tennessee (OIG, 1995b; GAO,
1996). Some of this regional variation may have been attrib-
utable to lack of alternative services (Mauser & Miller, 1994).
Other research found that patient characteristics could partial-
ly explain such variation (Schore, 1994). For example, benefi-
ciaries in the East South Central region (Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) with the second highest
use rates in 1993, "were more likely to be frail, chronically ill
and in poorer health" and from non-metropolitan counties
with high proportions of impoverished elderly (GAO, 1996,
p.13).
From the mid-1990s Congress pushed for additional
programs focused on uncovering fraud and abuse within
the Medicare system, including the Medicare Home Health
Initiative, Operation Restore Trust and the Health Insurance
Portability Act (P.L. 104-191). Using the high use figures from
the early years after the Duggan decision, a picture was painted
of a benefit running rampant and eating ever larger amounts
of the GDP. Clearly, however, utilization had begun to level
off, and growth rates were declining for the most part after
1991. Interestingly, early findings from OIG reported 219 cases
(in five states studied) of potential fraud and abuse in 1995.
Only 20% of these fraud cases were home health agencies,
and of those cases, only one conviction and one settlement
concerned home health providers (OIG, 1995c). As with other
social welfare programs, the argument regarding abuse of the
system may have been based more on a desire to curb costs
than on reality.
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The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997
Although expenditure growth had declined dramatically
through the 90s from a high of almost 40% in 1991 to only 5%
in 1996, the Republican-controlled Congress established the
rhetoric and defined the argument for additional program cuts
in the mid to late 1990s. Their argument rested on the premise
that home health spending was increasing disproportionately
compared to overall Medicare spending. For example, ana-
lysts began citing that while the average annual growth rate
for total Medicare spending was only 11% (1989-1996) the
average annual growth rate for home health care was 29% in
that same time period (Komisar & Feder, 1998). They stressed
two assumptions to define the problem causing the so-called
rampant growth in the benefit: 1) home health care was being
turned into a long-term care benefit, which was not part of the
original legislative intent; and 2) fraud and abuse were driving
much of this inappropriate utilization. Congressional activity
culminated in the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
which made major changes to the Medicare program overall
and specifically to the home health care benefit.
The key provisions relevant to home health care included
creation of a new, short-term reimbursement structure-the
interim payment system (IPS), elimination of venipuncture as
a qualifying benefit, creation of a surety bond procedure for
providers, establishment of a prospective payment system
(PPS) and an additional 15% cut when the PPS went into effect
(budget neutrality clause). Also, the Act redefined the term in-
termittent for eligibility purposes to include:
skilled nursing care that is either provided or needed
on fewer than seven days each week or less than eight
hours of each day for periods of 21 days or less [with
extensions in exceptional circumstances when the need
for additional care is finite and predictable]. (Balanced
Budget Act, 1997, p. 224)
The Interim Payment System (1997)
The most substantial change in terms of cost-cutting poten-
tial and home care practice was the IPS. There were two main
goals behind the creation of the IPS. First, this would immedi-
ately restrain expenditures within the home health program
by controlling volume per person. Second, it would allow
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time for CMS to ready a prospective payment system. In fact,
implementation of the PPS was delayed and the IPS extended
until October of 2000 (see Table 2 for Post-BBA legislation.) The
IPS set new cost limits for Medicare-certified home health care
agencies. Under the IPS, agencies would be reimbursed based
on "the lowest of: (1) actual costs; (2) new per-visit limits; or (3)
a blended, agency-specific per-beneficiary annual limit" (BBA,
1997, p.87-88). Visit limits were set at 105% of the median na-
tional visit limits, down from 112% of the mean national costs.
This was increased to 106% after October 1998 (see Table 2).
Early projections indicated that the per-visit limits alone could
have reduced expenditures by 15-22% (Berke, 1998; Forster,
1998).
However, most agencies would fall under the per-ben-
eficiary limit. The per-beneficiary limit was the first time that
Medicare established a cap on home health reimbursement at
the beneficiary level. This limit was calculated using a blended
formula incorporating 75% of the agency's average per-ben-
eficiary payment and 25% of the regional average from 1994,
which, due to the market basket freeze, meant 1993 costs (Berke,
1998; Forster, 1998; GAO, 1998). This limit was also increased
slightly for some agencies after October, 1998 (see Table 2).
As can be seen in Table 1, utilization plummeted after
implementation of the IPS. Dramatic decreases in users, visits
and expenditures occurred. In fact, utilization decreased much
more than originally projected by the Congressional Budget
Office (Leon, Davitt, & Marainen, 2002). Growth in the program
hit negative numbers; growth in total charges and total visits
declined by almost 40%, while charges and visits per user de-
clined by almost 30% from 1997 to 1998. Negative growth in
the program continued through 2001.
There were several problems with the IPS. First, agency
reimbursements were reduced to 1993 levels, representing a
dramatic reduction. Second, the per-beneficiary limit intro-
duced capitation in the traditional home care benefit for the
first time, forcing agencies into a risk-sharing arrangement,
thus requiring drastic changes in how agencies delivered ser-
vices. Although the per-beneficiary limit was an aggregate
agency limit, it was not case-mix adjusted for the varying care
needs of individual patients (Berke, 1998; GAO, 1998; Komisar
& Feder, 1998). Many agency directors did not understand the
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aggregate nature of the limit and thus slashed services to each
patient (Davitt & Choi, 2007). Also, agencies were not given
their per-beneficiary limits until March of 1998, requiring
them to operate for several months without knowing their cap
(Leon, Davitt, & Marainen, 2002). This encouraged agencies to
cut services more drastically than necessary to ensure financial
stability. These problems and the agencies' reactions explain
the dramatic drop in use and costs at the beginning of the IPS.
Lacking case-mix adjustment, agencies were encouraged
to discriminate in admissions against higher-cost patients,
either those needing more care, those further from the agency,
or those with expensive care needs (Kaye & Davitt, 1999). "The
adjuster would not only protect access to care but would also
help ensure that Medicare was paying agencies appropriately,"
that is, based on patient acuity (Dummit, 1998, p.10). Although
the rhetoric focused on fraud and abuse, the actual changes
did not focus on inappropriate use as the target for reduction.
Rather, the reductions were applied across the board and did
not attempt to provide a way for agencies to continue serving
legitimate, high-cost or high-use patients.
Also, the incentives in the capitated rates did not factor
in previous efficiency patterns of the agency, even though the
assumption was that those agencies with higher use and ex-
penditure rates pre-BBA '97 were providing inappropriate, if
not fraudulent services to patients (Lewin, 1997). Because the
per-beneficiary limits were based on a blended formula, using
75 percent of the agency's average costs and 25 percent of the
region's average costs in 1994, agencies with higher reimburse-
ments in 1994 received a higher reimbursement under the IPS.
Thus, those agencies that were operating in a fiscally conserva-
tive manner prior to the BBA '97, were penalized more severe-
ly under the IPS. Again, the design of the policy did not create
incentives to eliminate inappropriate use of the benefit.
Changes in Home Health Care After the IPS
Dramatic shifts in the system of care and the use of the
home health benefit occurred immediately after implementa-
tion of the IPS. Between 1997 and 1999, over 3,800 agencies
left the Medicare program (Davitt & Choi, 2006). Some studies
also documented increases in skilled nursing facility (SNF)
use during the IPS (Davitt & Marcus, 2008; Lin, Kane, Mehr,
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Madsen, & Petroski, 2006; McCall et.al., 2002). Also, agencies
altered their admissions practices in order to limit the number
of high-cost patients admitted, provided fewer services to in-
dividual patients than previously, and established stricter dis-
charge procedures, especially for perceived high-cost patients
(Davitt & Choi, 2007; Markham-Smith, Maloy, & Hawkins,
1999; MedPAC, 1999). Directors used various strategies to
sustain the agency financially during these dramatic cuts in
Table 2: Legislative Changes to Medicare Home Health Care Post-BBA
Legislation Changes to Home Health Care
Omnibus
Consolidated
and Emergency
Appropriations
Act of 1998
(Pub. L. 105-277)
Medicare,
Medicaid
and SCHIP
Balanced Budget
Refinement Act
of 1999
(Pub. L. 106-113)
Medicare,
Medicaid and
SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and
Protection Act of
2000
(Pub. L. 106-554)
Medicare
Prescription Drug
Improvement and
Modernization
Act of 2003
(Pub. L. 108-173)
The Deficit
Reduction Act of
2005
(Pub. L. 109-171)
Increased the per-visit reimbursement to 106% of the
national median after October 1, 1998. Per-beneficiary limits
for established agencies (those that had full year
participation in Medicare before FY 1994) were increased
by 1/3 of the difference between their amount (lesser) and
the national median; agencies created between 94-98 were
increased to 100% of FY 94 costs; agencies created after
Oct. 1 1998 decreased to 75% of national median based on
98% of FY 1994 costs. Reduced home health market basket
updates for FY2002 and 2003. Changed effective date of PPS
implementation and 15% contingency reduction to October
1, 2000.
Delayed the 1500 reduction in payments until 1 year after
PPS implementation. Excluded durable medical equipment
from consolidated billing requirements.
Delayed the mandated 15% reduction in the PPS until
October 1, 2002. Reduced the rural add-on to 10' for 2 years
beginning April 1, 2001.
Eliminated OASIS assessments on non-Medicare patients.
Modified the rural add-on, 5% for 1 year begrining April
1, 2004. Established a 2-year demonstration study on the
homebound definition and a MedPAC study on payment
margins for home health agencies. Altered the market basket
(inflation) updates from fiscal to calendar year beginning
Jan. 1, 2005 and .8% reductions in updates from April 2004-
Dec. 2006.
Restored the 5% rural add-on for one year. Established a
requirement for submission of health care quality data and
financial penalties beginning in 2007 for failure to report
quality data to CMS. Provided a 2.3% market basket update
in 2005 but 0% update for 2006. Lowered the fixed dollar
limit used to calculate outlier payments for 2005.
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reimbursements, including eliminating staff, shifting staff
roles, staff training on reimbursement methods, increased
use of telephone monitoring, increasing patient-family edu-
cation and self-care, and cutting services to patients (Davitt,
2003; Davitt & Choi, 2007; Markham-Smith Maloy, & Hawkins,
1999).
Agencies cut staff and visits more dramatically for non-
skilled services (home health aide and medical social work)
during the IPS. Skilled nursing and therapy services in-
creased the most (Davitt & Choi, 2007; Komisar, 2002; McCall,
Petersons, Moore, & Korb, 2003; MedPAC, 1999; McCall et al.,
2001). Other studies showed that agencies were shifting dually
eligible patients from Medicare to Medicaid because they
could get more services under the Medicaid program (Davitt &
Choi, 2007; Spector, Cohen, & Pesis-Katz, 2004). Agencies also
reported greater referrals to aging network providers, and in-
creased use of informal caregivers to supplement the agency's
service (Davitt & Choi, 2007). Again, such shifting of care from
one system to another does not necessarily mean savings in
overall expenditures-it simply shifts which component of the
health system is paying for care. Responsibility for care was
devolving from the federal to state and local levels, as well as
being informalized (Estes & Swan, 1993).
Studies demonstrated greater decreases in services for vul-
nerable subgroups of patients. Fitzgerald et al. (2006) found
larger decreases in use for elderly and female patients. McCall
et al. (2003) found higher-than-average decreases in home
health care use and the likelihood of any use during the IPS
period for beneficiaries over age 85, and a greater decrease
in visits for patients over 85 and with diabetes, heart failure,
cerebrovascular disease, and skin ulcers. While controlling
for predisposing and enabling characteristics, studies showed
that users with greater functional impairment saw a greater
decrease in visits than those with fewer impairments (Davitt
& Marcus, 2008; Liu et al., 2003). Other studies also found re-
ductions in use of the benefit for less healthy users (Davitt &
Marcus, 2008; McKnight, 2006). Furthermore, studies found
greater decreases in access to or use of home health care for
minority beneficiaries (Davitt & Kaye, 2007; McCall et al., 2001;
McCall et al., 2003) and for lower-income beneficiaries after the
IPS (Davitt, 2003; Fitzgerald et al., 2006; McKnight, 2006).
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Such across-the-board cuts could not discriminate legiti-
mate from illegitimate use. The goal of the IPS was to quickly
reduce costs. Thus, incentives in this policy were not tied di-
rectly to the provision of appropriate and adequate care. In
fact, the cuts may have generated additional problems related
to fraud when truly needy patients were discharged too
soon or denied access to the benefit. Retrospective research
studies provide evidence that vulnerable patients were more
dramatically affected by these changes. However, there are
mixed results regarding whether reduced access to this benefit
led to poorer health outcomes for home health users (McCall
2002; McKnight, 2006).
2000 and Beyond: Focus on the Prospective Payment System (2000)
With implementation of the Prospective Payment System
(PPS) in October 2000, CMS began to deal with the chronic
oversight problems by establishing a structure which reim-
bursed agencies based on patient need rather than on arbitrary
criteria or agency cost history. The PPS continues the prospec-
tive payment arrangement but with case mix adjustment.
Agencies now receive a fixed payment for a 60-day episode of
care for each patient which is based on their acuity, originally
measured via 80 home health resource groups. Acuity is estab-
lished through a comprehensive assessment, Outcomes and
Assessment Information Set (OASIS), conducted by the home
care agency, which measures client's clinical severity, function-
al status and service needs. Thus, agencies are paid based on
the expected service needs for different categories of patients,
rather than on actual cost to deliver the service (pre-BBA) or on
an arbitrarily derived per-beneficiary limit (IPS). Under PPS,
however, the agency continues to shoulder the financial risk of
serving the patient.
The main concern with the PPS was that its base rate was
established using cost figures from the drastically reduced IPS.
Thus, researchers continue to evaluate the impact on patients
and agencies. Studies show a slight decline in the likelihood
of home care use after the PPS was implemented (Murtaugh,
McCall, Moore, & Meadow, 2003), but this was much less
than under the IPS (Fitzgerald et al., 2006). After 2001, use of
the home health benefit gradually increased. While growth
rates moved onto the positive side, they remain well below
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the average growth rate for the overall Medicare program
(see Table I and Figures 1-3). Also, over 1,200 agencies left
the Medicare program from 2000-2002 (Davitt &Choi, 2006).
Cuts in staff and visits were greater under the IPS than the
PPS. Agencies continued to cut non-skilled services more
than skilled services under the PPS (Davitt & Choi, 2007).
One study showed that patients with orthopedic and neuro-
logic diagnoses experienced increases in access to home health
care during the first year of the PPS relative to other diagnosis
groupings (Murtaugh et al., 2003). Again, incentives under the
PPS (namely increased payment for therapy needs) encour-
aged agencies to target certain types of patients for whom they
could get higher reimbursements.
Figure 1: Expenditure Growth, Total and Per User
50 -
40
20
10 -
40
-50 -
Year
Figure 2: Growth in Users, Total and Per 1,000 Enrollees
60 -
40 I ,Total Per 1000I
3040
20
-10
-21 ' I0 Io o I I, I 'C ' I''- I o o I I I oql I I o 'Z I --
4 ,£& 4 -. KA&6 -& 4- 1v &A6 --&
Co o C Co Co O Y Y~Y~ C C
Medicare Home Health Care 267
Post-PPS Changes (2000-2008)
Early changes after the PPS focused mainly on adjustments
to agency reimbursements to achieve the mandated level of
savings [budget neutrality component of the BBA] (GAO,
2002). Research conducted by the GAO and MedPAC demon-
strated higher payments than costs, on average, for agencies,
and MedPAC recommended decreases in or freezes on the
market basket updates (GAO, 2002; 2004; MedPAC, 2006; 2007).
Figure 3: Growth in Total and Per Person Visits
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Likewise, monitoring systems were established which require
agencies to report certain quality indicator data to CMS for the
Home Health Quality Initiative. Agency submission of quality
data was mandated beginning in calendar year 2007, with fi-
nancial penalties for failure to submit (CMS, 2007). The focus
is on providing consumers with information on the practice
effectiveness of home health agencies. In addition, some ana-
lysts have recommended incorporating Medicare-agency risk
sharing in relation to profit-loss margins and/or tying agency
payment to outcome indicators (GAO, 2004; MedPAC, 2006).
The most substantial changes, scheduled to be implement-
ed on January 1, 2008, will dramatically alter the case-mix
adjustment formula, resulting in 153 Home Health Resource
Groups. These revisions are the result of extensive research
which showed that the original case-mix model was no
longer accurate in predicting service needs and that therapy
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thresholds were inadequate (CMS, 2007b). In 2008 a new,
four-equation case-mix formula will be used, which expands
the number of therapy thresholds, the number of diagnosis
groups, and adds scores for certain conditions and certain sec-
ondary diagnoses. This model also "recognizes and differenti-
ates payment for episodes of care based on whether a patient
is in.. .an early (1s' or 2 nd episode...) or later (the 3 d episode
and beyond...) episode of care as well as recognizing whether
a patient was a high therapy (14 or more therapy visits) or
low therapy (13 or fewer therapy visits) case" (CMS, 2007,
p. 49764). The expressed goal of these changes is to "ensure
that the payment system continues to produce appropriate
compensation for providers while retaining opportunities to
manage home health care efficiently" (CMS, 2007b, p. 25358).
Analysis
Assumptions regarding the goal of the Medicare home
health care benefit (acute care vs. long-term care) and the ap-
propriate target population for service (post-acute vs. chroni-
cally ill) have been at the heart of this policy debate over time.
Fluctuations in these assumptions have dramatically altered
eligibility, at times expanding and at times restricting access. In
the early history, Congressional intent was focused on expan-
sion. This was controlled by a conservative executive branch
focused on reducing the size of the federal government.
Likewise, CMS' inability to develop consistent standards for
review of practice was both influenced by this tug-of-war
(mixed messages and a desire to control costs by maintaining
vague guidelines) while also providing fuel for the debate (the
argument that variation in use patterns were indicative of the
need for cost control measures). Throughout the program's
history, policy interventions focused on controlling costs rather
than responding to legitimate need by improving quality and
efficient delivery. Likewise, policy changes generated reac-
tions at the practice level. Agencies gamed the system, that is,
they strategically altered their admissions and service deliv-
ery practices in response to these changes, in order to continue
to provide services while maintaining fiscal stability (Dowd,
2004; Ford, Wells, & Bailey, 2004). Thus, both policy and imple-
mentation were critical to benefit use throughout this history
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(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).
Home health care trends are embedded in a larger socio-po-
litical-economic context that is influenced by and influences the
social construction of categories of redistribution (Calasanti &
Zajicek, 1993; Stone, 1984). In a capitalist economy, production
and surplus value are necessary to establish any system of re-
distribution. Thus entitlement programs are, by nature, limited
(Offe, 1984; Stone, 1984). The management of category creation
and expansion, therefore, becomes central to the program and
the welfare state in general (Stone), and assumptions must be
made about who should be recognized as deserving of social
aid, and how much or what type of aid they deserve. In order
to prevent complete breakdown of the economic system, cat-
egories of entitlement must be highly restrictive, defined so
that the number of people who can possibly belong to them
is very small relative to those who can not (Stone). In home
health care, the market-based assumption would limit use to
those requiring short-term post-acute care. The needs-based
assumption would expand access to those needing care on a
longer-term basis for chronic conditions. The battle is waged
between forces supporting distribution based on market prin-
ciples (restrictive) and those based on need (expansionary), the
fundamental assumptions in this debate (Estes & Swan, 1993;
Higgins, 1988).
Furthermore, categories of redistribution require a validat-
ing device to determine who is actually eligible. The validat-
ing device must either be restrictive or intentionally vague to
manage distribution and maintain the status quo (Stone, 1984).
In home health care, there is a two-tier process of eligibility.
First, there is an administrative category which establishes
broad-based eligibility for Medicare. This includes either being
age 65 or older, having a long-term disability or a diagnosis of
End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD). However, eligibility for the
home health benefit can only be established based on specific
clinical criteria, that is, whether the person is homebound and
has a need for intermittent skilled care. This system of eligibil-
ity determination has an inherent flaw in that the validating
device can be manipulated by the beneficiary, the provider or
the system (Stone). There is also a great deal of uncertainty and
subjective judgment on the part of the physician in determin-
ing eligibility and the agency in deciding how much service
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the person should receive. Thus, providers become mediators
between the patient and the system and a central player in the
implementation process and the battle for control over benefit
use.
The restrictive and unclear nature of the categories of re-
distribution in home health care can be seen in the early days
of the program and especially in the definition of part-time
and intermittent care. Agencies responded to these restrictions
by limiting access to the benefit. After Congress eliminated
specific restrictions on the benefit (e.g. visit limits, hospitaliza-
tion rule), agencies began offering services to additional ben-
eficiaries. This required even greater tightening of the validat-
ing device to control redistribution. Thus, CMS, an arm of the
executive branch of government which was then controlled
by a Republican administration keen on reducing the size of
the federal government, issued transmittals further restricting
access to the benefit by changing the validating device from
part-time or intermittent care to part-time and intermittent
care. Agencies hoping to avoid financial liability for non-re-
imbursed care responded by reducing the number of patients
and the amount of care provided. Pressure from increased
demand due to the IPPS resulted in a lawsuit, which focused
on redefining the validating device in an expansionary direc-
tion. Agencies again reacted to this by providing services to
additional beneficiaries and by providing more service per
beneficiary. Post-Duggan agencies had nothing to lose, and in
fact, much to gain, if a patient was certified as eligible. The lack
of patient cost-sharing at that time also eliminated any finan-
cial incentive for the beneficiary to refuse service.
The focus historically was not on meeting older adults'
needs but on manipulating the categories of redistribution in
order to control expenditures. The policy incentives were not
geared to encourage appropriate, adequate and efficient care
delivery. The focus in the 1970s and 1980s was on directly con-
trolling the validating device (part-time-intermittent). When
that effort was derailed by the Duggan decision, the focus in
the 1990s turned to controlling the mediator or agency be-
havior, thus indirectly controlling the validating device (e.g.,
anti-fraud measures, inflation freezes, IPS). Of course, each
change generated a reaction from agencies which also influ-
enced benefit use. The interests of the agency were reversed
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over time, shifting back and forth between being aligned with
the beneficiary to being aligned with the program.
The combination of incentives in the policy and gaming be-
haviors at the practice level had the potential to generate fraud
in two directions-either over or under use (Dowd, 2004; Ford,
Wells, & Bailey, 2004). Our health care system encourages agen-
cies to be invested in providing health care services, rather than
invested in health. For most of this history, the policy was to
reward (through reimbursements) agencies, not for improving
or maintaining health, but for providing health care (Dowd,
2004). As reimbursement incentives change, agency practices
adjust to continue the provision of health care and organiza-
tion maintenance (Dowd, 2004). For example, post-Duggan in-
centives discouraged agencies from eliminating overuse and
may have encouraged many agencies to provide too much
service relative to need. On the other hand, the IPS encour-
aged agencies to serve fewer patients and to offer fewer visits,
regardless of patient need or health status. It may be more ac-
curate to say that the goal of the IPS and the 1984-86 transmit-
tals was not to reduce inappropriate utilization but simply to
reduce utilization-to shift the balance between the market-
based system of redistribution and the needs-based system.
The Duggan decision also did not force CMS to devise a reim-
bursement structure directly responsive to need. Throughout
this history, use of the benefit, therefore, was driven less by
patient need or health status than by arbitrary interpretations
of the validating device and perverse incentives which encour-
aged agencies to adjust the amount of service, based not on
patient need but on specific reimbursement procedures. These
interpretations were influenced by opposing political ideolo-
gies-on one side the market-based model and on the other
the needs-based-equity model (Andersen, 1995; Estes & Swan,
1993; Higgins, 1988).
Conclusion
The home health care policy history demonstrates the
importance of all three branches of government in creating
policy, as well as the influence of both the policy mandate
and policy implementation in shaping benefit use (Pressman
& Wildavsky, 1984). The legislative branch enacted the
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original Medicare program and changes intended to expand
access to the home health benefit. The executive branch, through
its administrative arm (CMS), tightened eligibility via its over-
sight and implementation function through the creation of a
new program rule. This arbitrary rule was overturned by the
judicial branch (Duggan decision), dramatically expanding eli-
gibility and altering oversight procedures. Finally, in the 1990s
the Republican-controlled Congress used the BBA to reign in
costs by encouraging agencies to cut services to patients. Every
change in the policy generated reactions from agency provid-
ers focused on sustaining their role in the health care system
(Dowd, 2004). Benefit use was thus affected, not only by the
policy sanction, but by program implementation at the admin-
istrative as well as the agency level (Pressman & Wildavsky,
1984).
It took decades for CMS to create appropriate limits on use
of the benefit and consistent standards for providing home
health care based on need. The bad news is that the base rate
for the PPS was derived from dramatically slashed IPS costs,
thus to some degree continuing a market-based approach.
Likewise, incentives around therapy thresholds in the original
case-mix formula may have encouraged agencies to provide
more therapy services than needed to increase their reimburse-
ment. The good news is that under the home health PPS, we
now have consistent rules for determining eligibility (albeit still
subject to some degree of manipulation at the practice end) and
service need based on a comprehensive and empirically tested
set of patient factors. These factors are currently being revised
to promote efficient but quality care. The OASIS assessment
allows care to be geared to each patient's need or health status
and allows an opportunity to assess the quality of care provid-
ed by generating data on patient outcomes, thus shifting from
a focus on health care delivery to health status. This will enable
us to more accurately monitor quality and efficiency patterns
in the future and determine whether the market-based foun-
dation (IPS) and future revisions to the case-mix model are ad-
equate to meet patient need.
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